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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Putin’s Societal  
Distancing
Prioritizing Power in the  
Corona Pandemic
COVID-19 hit Russia during a deci-
sive period for securing the future of 
Vladimir Putin’s regime. The Kremlin 
is still pursuing its main goal while 
dealing with the pandemic and its 
economic impact: keeping costs low 
and shifting responsibilities to oth-
ers. Although this strategy is leading 
to a growing gap between the Rus-
sian state and its citizens, it is un-
likely that the regime will change its 
course. It will rather become more re-
pressive, making Russia an even more 
difficult partner for the EU.
The coronavirus struck Russia right 
when President Vladimir Putin was 
about to secure his political future. 
Ahead of parliamentary elections in 
2021 and presidential elections in 2024, 
Putin initiated constitutional changes 
that would have paved the way for him 
to stay in office until 2036. As a finish-
ing touch, a popular vote was planned 
for late April 2020 that would have en-
dorsed the changes and caused them 
to come into force, but this vote had 
to be postponed due to the pandem-
ic. Now, the Kremlin is focusing on its 
goal of keeping costs associated with 
fighting the virus as low as possible.
Although the coronavirus is a huge 
challenge for Russia’s citizens and they 
urgently need state support, the Krem-
lin is treating the pandemic as an an-
noying obstacle on its path to securing 
regime stability. Consequently, Putin 
intends to preserve his main political 
resource – Russia’s budgetary and oth-
er financial reserves – for addressing 
the political projects he deems to be 
crucially important.
CORONA’S EARLY ARRIVAL 
AND THE KREMLIN’S 
BELATED RESPONSE
The first two cases of coronavirus in-
fection in Russia were registered on 
January 31, 2020, in the regions of the 
Ural and Far East; both were Chinese 
citizens. In January, the Russian gov-
ernment already responded to the 
spread of COVID-19 in China by set-
ting up a task force and closing the 
Russian-Chinese border. In the same 
period, however, coronavirus test-
ing remained at a very low level: only 
32,000 tests were conducted until 
February. The official number of cases 
of coronavirus infection in Russia re-
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mained low for a long time, which 
caused much suspicion about the qual-
ity and coverage of testing.
Suspicion particularly grew due to the 
sharp increase in the number of pneu-
monia cases in Moscow from January 
on, possibly caused by coronavirus. In 
February, the number of people suffer-
ing from pneumonia there was 54 per-
cent higher than a year before while no 
new cases of COVID-19 were official-
ly registered until March 2. The official 
number of coronavirus infections only 
started to increase at the end of March.
As of April 30, 2020, almost 106,000 
cases of coronavirus were registered 
in all 85 regions of Russia with more 
than 1,070 people dead. Testing al-
so increased: so far, almost 3.5 million 
tests have been conducted, making 
Russia one of the leading countries 
in terms of testing for COVID-19. The 
intensity of the virus’s spread var-
ies from region to region. It has hit 
Moscow and the Moscow Oblast par-
ticularly hard with more than 65,000 
cases. The pandemic has revealed ma-
ny shortages within Russia’s health-
care system. For example, the country 
lacks ventilators, other medical de-
vices, and personal protective equip-
ment, which has put an enormous 
strain on health-care workers.
Recent developments show that Presi-
dent Putin has been convinced to take 
the pandemic seriously. He has already 
postponed both political events sched-
uled for this spring that were most im-
portant to him: the all-Russia vote on 
April 22 on the constitutional chang-
es he proposed and the Victory Day 
parade on May 9 to mark the seven-
ty-fifth anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War. This year’s parade 
was to bring Putin together with world 
leaders and veterans from all over the 
country, sending a highly symbolic 
message about the strength and power 
of Russia and its president both inter-
nally and externally.
PUTIN’S THRIFTY 
APPROACH
Putin’s direct involvement in combat-
ing the virus came late and remains 
limited. In his public speeches to the 
Russian people, he presents a pic-
ture of ever-increasing help by an-
nouncing new measures in each new 
address. This tactic allows him to re-
main the main “guarantor” of the dis-
tribution of much-needed financial 
assistance. The actual timing of the 
disbursement of support, however, is 
more dependent on Putin’s plans and 
less on the objective situation with 
the virus. Apparently, its time has not 
yet come. Corresponding to the polit-
ical logic described above, the Krem-
lin is not likely to disburse large-scale 
financial aid until closer to a resched-
uled all-Russia vote on Putin’s pro-
posed constitutional changes or the 
next elections.
The budgetary measures allocated 
to combating the coronavirus and its 
consequences so far only amount to a 
total of around 2.8 percent of Russia’s 
GDP. These measures consist mostly of 
tax relief and loan guarantees and less 
from direct payments and stimulus. 
Comparatively, they are much small-
er than the financial support provid-
ed by countries such as Germany or 
France. The Russian government is al-
so reluctant to tap a $165 billion na-
tional wealth fund for direct financial 
assistance, preferring instead to use it 
to support future budget expenditure.
The support approved so far is defi-
nitely not enough to sufficiently help 
citizens and businesses, which were 
already facing economic problems be-
fore the coronavirus crisis. In the first 
quarter of 2020, the real disposable 
income of Russians decreased by 0.2 
percent compared to the same period 
in 2019; further decline is expected in 
the second quarter. As over 60 percent 
of Russians do not have any savings, 
the social situation could become dif-
ficult for a significant proportion of the 
population. Approximately 30 percent 
of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) had to send employees on un-
paid leave, while more than 20 percent 
of companies cut salaries and 16 per-
cent had already dismissed staff during 
the country’s first “non-working week,” 
which began in late March.
STILL A VERY POPULAR  
PRESIDENT
Though economic hardships are al-
ready visible, they have not affected 
President Putin’s popularity to an ex-
tent significant enough to radically 
change his approach to combating the 
virus. A survey conducted from April 
13 to 19 by the Russian Public Opin-
ion Research Center (VTsIOM) showed 
that 69.8 percent of respondents trust 
Vladimir Putin. This is slightly low-
er than results of 72.1 to 70.5 percent 
from the end of March to the begin-
ning of April. Polls by the indepen-
dent Levada Center indicate a similar 
trend: the level of approval of Putin’s 
presidential activities fell from 69 per-
cent to 63 percent between February 
and March. As for the measures adopt-
ed by the president and the govern-
ment, they were only fully approved 
of by 46 percent of Russians at the end 
of April while 48 percent considered 
them wrong. 
In order to protect his reputation, 
Putin has shifted most of the responsi-
bility for combatting the virus to Mos-
cow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, and to 
the regional governors. It remains to 
be seen how the governors will man-
age the crisis and whether their per-
formance could create unexpected 
legitimacy for them as regional lead-
ers. A recent survey shows that 75 
percent of citizens are satisfied with 
the governors’ responses to the vi-
rus crisis; more than 50 percent of re-
spondents see the measures taken by 
regional authorities as sufficient. Ac-
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cording to the Levada Center, the peo-
ple trust regional governors almost as 
much as Putin. Under the current con-
stellation of vertical power, however, it 
is unlikely that these governors – many 
of whom are technocrats selected by 
Moscow and who have few local con-
nections – could constitute any count-
er-balance to the Kremlin. Instead, 
they could be used by the Kremlin as 
scapegoats for potential failures.
Moreover, draconian legislation is in 
place to prevent mass protests; strict 
rules for demonstrations have already 
been enforced. Additionally, digital 
control has been actively adopted un-
der the cloak of the fighting the pan-
demic. A new law allows those who 
spread “fake news” about the corona-
virus to be prosecuted. Additional new 
legislation stipulates harsh punishment 
for quarantine violation.
Until now, only small protest gath-
erings have taken place in some of 
Russia’s regions. Yet in many cities – 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, 
and others – people are expressing 
their dissatisfaction through an inno-
vative form of online protest. They are 
using the Yandex.Navigator, a popu-
lar application created by one of the 
country’s biggest internet compa-
nies, to virtually “gather” around offi-
cial buildings and write protest slogans 
in their comments, demanding social 
payments and government support.
GROWING DISCONNECT
So far, it is unlikely that the Krem-
lin will change its tactics and spend 
more to help Russian citizens in the 
pandemic. Instead, the regime is sav-
ing money for the political projects it 
deems most important for securing 
its power. It is still unclear, however, 
whether the planned all-Russia vote on 
Putin’s constitutional changes or even 
regional elections scheduled for Sep-
tember 2020 can take place – although 
the latter was supposed to be a quasi- 
rehearsal for parliamentary elections 
in 2021. As campaigning might be com-
plicated due to the virus and voting 
could give the Russian people a plat-
form to express their discontent, it 
would not be surprising if the Krem-
lin decides to postpone these region-
al elections.
Instead of designing a massive eco-
nomic and social bailout package, the 
regime is more likely to use the tools 
it is most familiar with: spending lim-
ited resources to secure a minimally 
sufficient level of public support, in-
creasing the dependency of businesses 
and citizens on the state even further, 
and using repression and intimida-
tion to keep the potential for protest 
at bay. These measures will neither re-
solve the growing disconnect between 
the state and society, nor will they ad-
equately address the economic and so-
cial problems Russia is facing. Rather, 
they will likely make the country even 
more authoritarian.
The Kremlin’s domestic trajectory will 
make Russia a more difficult and un-
predictable partner not only for the 
European Union, but also for other 
champions of multilateralism. As long 
as the pandemic lasts, Moscow will not 
change its foreign policy. Instead, it 
will continue its disinformation cam-
paigns inside the countries of the EU 
and strengthen its strategic partner-
ship with China. As Germany prepares 
for its EU presidency in the second 
half of 2020, the challenges that both 
sides have been facing since before the 
pandemic have not diminished. The 
common ground on which to deal with 
them, however, has. 
